ASSIGNMENT代写

阿德莱德代写assignment:克雷格

2017-04-19 00:47

克雷格和De Burca进一步观察,“[t]他委员会和CFI有其他方式解决的问题从复杂的卡特尔,延长多年,与多个参与者,是框架方面的索赔协议和/或共同练习。这种方法的案例参考Limburgse乙烯[18],CFI表示,在一个复杂的侵权持续了许多年,欧盟委员会不得将每个分类为每个单独承担,不得违反证明有一个协议或者共同实践在整个时间欧佩克的存在。直接接触参与者之间不是必需的。在Suiker Unie[19]欧盟法院举行,参与者之间的任何直接或间接接触的对象或效应来影响市场行为的实际或潜在的竞争对手或披露等竞争对手的行为,他们决定采用或考虑采用市场上,被第81条。例如,在PVC[20]壳被发现参与卡特尔,尽管它并不是一个正式成员,但协调其行为根据其他卡特尔成员决定。在比利时啤酒,[21]没有直接反竞争行为的证据,但事实上举行了会议,讨论价格和客户足以相信勾结。
阿德莱德代写assignment:克雷格
Craig and De Burca further observe that “[t]he other way in which the Commission and CFI have tackled the problems flowing from complex cartels that extend over many years, with multiple participants, is to frame the claim in terms of ‘agreement and/or concerted practice.’ A case of reference for this approach is Limburgse Vinyl[18] where CFI stated that in a complex infringement which lasted many years, the Commission shall not be expected to classify each violation for each undertaking individually and shall not prove that there was an agreement or a concerted practice throughout the whole time the cartel existed.Direct contact between participants is not required. In Suiker Unie[19] the ECJ held that any direct or indirect contact between the participants the object or effect of which is to influence market conduct of an actual or potential competitor or to disclose to such a competitor the course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the market, is caught by Article 81.For example, in PVC[20] Shell was found to participate in cartel even though it was not a full member but coordinated its behaviour according to the decisions made by the other cartel members. In Belgian Beer,[21] there was no evidence of direct anti-competitive action but the fact that meetings to discuss prices and customers were held was enough to presume collusion.